COREDO – EU Legal & Compliance Services Expert legal consulting, financial licensing (EMI, PSP, CASP under MiCA), and AML/CFT compliance across the European Union. Headquartered in Prague, we provide seamless regulatory solutions in Germany, Poland, Lithuania, and all 27 EU member states.
Money laundering is not an abstract subject from the news — it is a concrete legal risk for any company that takes payments, opens accounts for clients or handles cash. At COREDO, we are asked less often "what is money laundering" and more often "how would a bank spot a scheme at our company" and "what happens if we miss a signal". This article sets out the methods FATF, Europol and EU regulators see most often, the current EU thresholds and fines as of November 2026, and where to start reviewing your own processes — for example, with outsourcing the AML function.
- According to UNODC and Europol estimates, 2–5% of global GDP is laundered every year — between EUR 715 billion and EUR 1.87 trillion, a scale the thresholds below are designed to catch.
- The EU customer-identification threshold for a one-off transaction is EUR 10,000; from 10 July 2027 this is set in law by the AMLR (Regulation (EU) 2024/1624), Article 19.
- Cash payments for a single deal are capped at EUR 10,000 — the limit is introduced by AMLR, Article 80.
- Money laundering in the EU carries a minimum maximum penalty of 4 years' imprisonment — Directive (EU) 2018/1673, Article 5(2).
- For a credit institution, the minimum maximum administrative fine is EUR 5,000,000 or 10% of annual turnover — Directive (EU) 2015/849, Article 59(3).
- Under EU law, a beneficial owner is anyone holding a stake of 25% or more — AMLR, Article 52.
- FATF keeps 18 jurisdictions under increased monitoring as of 30 October 2026.
- The Czech financial intelligence unit, FAÚ, has closed more than 28,000 cases and frozen over CZK 21 billion since it became independent, a scale that dwarfs the fines described below.
What is money laundering: definition and the three stages

Legally, money laundering is not "hiding cash" — it is three specific acts set out in Directive (EU) 2018/1673, Article 3(1): the conversion or transfer of property to conceal its criminal origin; the concealment or disguise of information about the source, location or ownership of property; and the acquisition, possession or use of property where the person knew it derived from criminal activity. These formulations trace back to the 1988 UN Vienna Convention, Article 3.1, and recur almost verbatim across EU national laws.
In practice, the process runs through three stages — the direct answer to "what is a money laundering example": placement, layering and integration. In reality the stages often blur or repeat; we explored how this affects business in detail separately, in "What Are the Three Stages of Money Laundering and Their Impact on Businesses". Here is a short map of the stages and methods found at each one.
| Stage | Goal | Typical methods | Why it's hard to detect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Placement | Introduce criminal proceeds into the financial system | Cash through a high-turnover business, structuring, cash courier transport | Looks like ordinary small-business revenue |
| Layering | Break the trail between the money and its source | Chains of transfers, offshore structures, fictitious trade invoices | Transactions are spread across jurisdictions and counterparties |
| Integration | Return the money to the economy as "clean" | Real estate, luxury goods, investment in a legitimate business | The asset is indistinguishable from one bought with lawful funds |
Cash payments, structuring and limits

Cash remains the most common placement method: high cash-turnover businesses — restaurants, car washes, pawnshops, currency exchanges — are traditionally used to feed money into circulation. The second frequent technique is structuring (smurfing): a large sum is split into tranches below the reporting threshold and paid in through different accounts, ATMs or individuals.
The EU responds with two thresholds. Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 requires cash of EUR 10,000 or more to be declared when crossing the EU's external border; amounts below that limit can still be recorded by customs if a link to criminal activity is suspected. From 10 July 2027, AMLR Article 80 introduces a single EU-wide limit: sellers of goods and services may accept no more than EUR 10,000 in cash from one buyer per transaction, including linked operations.
National rules apply in parallel. We covered the current changes to KYC/AML procedures for companies in the EU and the CIS since 2025 separately — see "New Requirements for KYC/AML Procedures in the EU and the CIS".
Trade finance: fictitious invoices (TBML)

Trade-based money laundering (TBML) manipulates trade documents rather than payments. FATF's classic typology describes four basic techniques: over- or under-invoicing the value of goods, issuing multiple invoices for the same shipment, over- or under-stating the quantity shipped, and directly misrepresenting the description of the goods.
TBML is hard to detect precisely because a single invoice rarely looks anomalous — the indicator is not one transaction but a systematic deviation of price from the market range, a mismatch between the weight or quantity of goods and the declared code, or repeated dealings with counterparties in jurisdictions with low beneficial-ownership transparency.
Offshore structures, shell companies and beneficial owners

A shell company is a legal entity with no real economic activity, set up to hold assets or make payments on behalf of the real beneficiary. A chain of such companies across jurisdictions is a standard layering tool: each extra link makes it harder for an investigator to reach the person who actually controls the money.
Laundering through offshore structures rarely stands alone — more often it serves another crime. Corruption proceeds, in particular, almost always need layering through a chain of legal entities before they re-enter the legitimate economy; we look at how banks test such offshore chains against public beneficial-ownership registers in "UBO Registries in 2026: How Banks Verify Transparency in Offshore Jurisdictions".
EU law addresses the risk of offshore chains through the concept of the beneficial owner.
Cryptocurrency and digital assets

A crypto-asset does not create a new laundering method on its own — it speeds up the classic three stages and makes layering harder to trace through mixers, chains of P2P exchanges and the cross-border nature of blockchain. We published a detailed breakdown of exactly how crypto schemes move through placement, layering and integration separately, in "Risk of Cryptocurrency Being Used to Launder Money". Here we cover only the current EU regulatory thresholds.
This lower threshold exists because Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 (the "Travel Rule") requires payer and payee information to be transmitted when crypto-assets are transferred between service providers — meaning the transaction itself is technically more transparent, but the volume and speed of transfers are higher than in a traditional banking channel.
Real estate and luxury goods

At integration, money has to look legitimate — and real estate suits that purpose better than almost any other asset: a high value per transaction, a subjective valuation and, for as long as an ownership structure is used, the ability to avoid disclosing the real buyer. FATF explicitly names the purchase of high-end property through anonymous companies as a persistent risk factor and, in 2022, updated its risk-based guidance for real estate agents.
Similar logic applies to luxury goods — cars, watches, art: high liquidity and the market's closed nature reduce the chance a deal reaches compliance's attention, unless the seller is itself an obliged entity under anti-money-laundering law.
Sector risk and red flags

Regulatory risk is not spread evenly: some sectors are structurally exposed because of their business model. High cash-turnover businesses, money service businesses, luxury-goods dealers, real estate agents and charities regularly appear on supervisory priority lists. We looked separately at the risks facing money service businesses in "Discovering the Risks of Money Laundering for Money Service Businesses".
At transaction level, compliance and the bank look for indicators that do not alone prove laundering but call for further checks:
- The transaction has no obvious economic or lawful purpose for the client's stated profile.
- The amount or structure of the deal is artificially split into parts below the reporting threshold.
- The counterparty is registered in a jurisdiction with low beneficial-ownership transparency and no business connection to the deal.
- Cash is paid in EUR 500 notes, close to the reporting limit — statistically, such notes feature less often in ordinary circulation.
- The price or quantity of goods on an invoice deviates from the market range with no explicable reason.
- The company changes beneficial owners, directors or jurisdiction right after opening an account.
- The client insists on urgency and avoids personal contact at identification.
The full list of documents a bank actually requests during a review is gathered in the checklist "Checklist of Documents for an AML Audit".
How banks and regulators detect money laundering

Detection is not built on a single check at account opening but on a chain of controls: customer identification, risk assessment, transaction monitoring and periodic review of the customer's profile. The path of a single suspicious signal through this chain is fairly predictable, though timing varies by country and by the workload of the particular financial intelligence unit (FIU).
- A monitoring alert fires — typically in real time or within a few hours of the transaction.
- A compliance analyst reviews the alert internally — usually 1–3 working days for a typical case.
- A decision is made on filing a suspicious transaction report (STR/SAR) with the FIU — without undue delay once the suspicion is formed.
- The FIU analyses the report — from a few days to several weeks, depending on complexity and priority.
- The file passes to law enforcement and, if confirmed, a criminal investigation follows — from months to years for complex international schemes.
The Czech FAÚ, set up under Act No. 253/2008 Coll., is a typical example of scale: since becoming independent, it has closed more than 28,000 cases and frozen over CZK 21 billion — a scale that dwarfs the fines discussed later — and it is just one of 27 national FIUs in the EU.
Since summer 2025, the network of national FIUs has also been coordinated by AMLA (Regulation (EU) 2024/1620), the EU's anti-money-laundering authority, established on 26 June 2024 and headquartered in Frankfurt. By the end of 2027, AMLA plans to grow its staff to 430 people, and from 2028 it will start direct supervision of some large financial institutions operating across several EU states.
Common business mistakes
In practice, a company is more often fined for a systemic weakness in its process than for a single missed payment. We gathered a breakdown of the specific breaches for which international businesses get fined in "6 Common AML Violations for Which International Businesses Are Fined". Among the recurring causes:
- A low risk category is assigned automatically, with no real assessment — signals get missed wherever a client formally passes on paper.
- Monitoring generates more alerts than the team can process — some signals get closed without analysis, simply due to backlog.
- Reports to the FIU are filed late — a delay of months after the suspicion formed turns a technical breach into a question of complicity.
- The client's profile is not periodically reviewed — the risk classification set at account opening goes unupdated for years as turnover and behaviour change.
- Responsibility is blurred across departments — a formally appointed MLRO receives no reports from the business lines and cannot influence decisions.
- Outsourcing operational tasks is treated as transferring responsibility — legally, it stays with the company regardless of who performs the check.
If an account has already been blocked on suspicion of an AML breach, we set out the steps a company should take in "What to Do if an Account Is Blocked for AML Reasons".
Liability: fines, confiscation, criminal sanctions
Liability for money laundering in the EU operates on two levels: administrative, for the organisation itself breaching procedures, and criminal, for the individuals who carried out or allowed the acts of legalisation. The table below compares the main regimes.
| Breach | Who is liable | Maximum sanction | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| General breach of AML procedures (inadequate CDD, monitoring, reporting) | Legal person | at least EUR 1,000,000 or twice the benefit derived from the breach | Directive (EU) 2015/849, Article 59(2)(e) |
| Serious, repeated or systematic breach | Credit/financial institution | at least EUR 5,000,000 or 10% of annual turnover | Directive (EU) 2015/849, Article 59(3)(a) |
| Same breach | Natural person | at least EUR 5,000,000 | Directive (EU) 2015/849, Article 59(3)(b) |
| Money laundering itself (conversion, concealment, use of property) | Natural person, criminal liability | minimum maximum of 4 years' imprisonment | Directive (EU) 2018/1673, Article 5(2) |
The ABN AMRO case shows how large real sanctions can be: in 2021, the Dutch Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie) approved a EUR 480 million settlement — EUR 300 million in fines and EUR 180 million in disgorgement of costs unlawfully saved on compliance. The bank was not shown to have run a deliberate scheme: prosecutors described systemic failures — 5.5 million mass-segment clients had been automatically classified as neutral risk with no real analysis, and one client had opened 192 accounts for 49 of their own companies.
Confiscation applies alongside monetary sanctions — seizure of the unlawfully obtained property, independent of any fine. In practice it is hard to estimate what share of criminal proceeds in the EU is seized: no single, up-to-date dataset covers every country.
How COREDO helps businesses with AML
Since 2016, COREDO has supported AML compliance for EMIs, PSPs, crypto businesses, fintechs and corporate clients in the EU — from an initial risk assessment to acting as an outsourced MLRO. If you need a quick, honest view of the real gap in your processes rather than a policy rewritten "for the file", start with an independent review — an AML audit.
For companies without the resource to keep an in-house specialist with direct access to management, the outsourced MLRO role fills that gap without a permanent hire. We gave a general overview of when outsourcing the AML function pays off in "Anti-Money Laundering Service Outsourcing".
What to do next
If none of the methods above has yet been checked against your own company in detail, a sensible order of action is this:
- Run an independent audit of your processes — typically 5–10 working days for a medium-sized company; it shows where the real gap between policy and practice lies.
- Close the gaps in customer identification and screening — 2 to 6 weeks depending on the number of clients and channels — KYC/KYB Screening.
- Appoint or strengthen the MLRO role with real access to management — typically 1–2 weeks to recruit or set up an outsourced role — Outsourced MLRO.
- Move operational routine to outsourcing if your in-house team is not enough — discuss it with us before a regulator finds the gap for you.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is money laundering in simple terms?
It is the legalisation of proceeds of crime: money runs through a series of transactions so its origin looks lawful. Legally, this is three separate acts under Directive (EU) 2018/1673, Article 3(1) — conversion or transfer, concealing the origin, and using property obtained through crime.
How is money laundered in practice — which method is most common?
At placement, the most common methods are cash through a high cash-turnover business and structuring sums below the EUR 10,000 reporting threshold. At integration, it is buying real estate and luxury goods, because these assets easily pass as the result of lawful income.
Is there a real example of a money laundering scheme?
Yes: in 2021, Dutch prosecutors found systemic gaps in ABN AMRO's AML procedures and approved a EUR 480 million settlement combining fines and disgorgement. In 2016, Europol and Spain's Civil Guard broke up a scheme, well above standard reporting thresholds, in which around EUR 62 million was laundered through property investment.
What is the penalty for money laundering in the EU?
For an individual — criminal liability with a minimum maximum of 4 years' imprisonment under Directive (EU) 2018/1673, Article 5(2). For an organisation — an administrative fine with a minimum maximum, for credit and financial institutions, of EUR 5,000,000 or 10% of annual turnover under Directive (EU) 2015/849, Article 59(3).
Many people search for "how to launder money" — what does compliance practice say?
It is not a how-to guide but a crime with real investigations and confiscation: every scheme leaves a financial trail, and bank and FIU detection systems are built to pick it up. The practical question for a lawful business is different — how to avoid being drawn unwittingly into someone else's scheme through a client or counterparty, which is what due diligence is for.
How does a bank know a transaction might be linked to money laundering?
Through a combination of the client's risk profile set at onboarding and transaction monitoring, which compares each transaction against that client's expected behaviour. A deviation — structuring, an atypical counterparty, EUR 500 notes near the reporting limit — creates an alert, which a compliance analyst reviews.
How does money laundering differ from tax evasion?
Tax evasion conceals lawfully earned income from taxation. Money laundering legalises income obtained through crime in the first place. Directive (EU) 2018/1673 explicitly includes tax crimes among the predicate offences, so the same sum sometimes falls under both at once.
Sources
- eur-lex.europa.eu — Legal definition of money laundering (conversion/transfer, concealment, acquisition/use of property) and the requirement of a minimum maximum of 4 years' imprisonment
- eur-lex.europa.eu — Definition of a predicate offence as an act punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, and the list of categories (Art. 2(1))
- www.unodc.org — The three stages of money laundering (placement/layering/integration) and the estimate of a global volume of 2-5% of world GDP per year
- www.europol.europa.eu — Estimate of the global laundering volume in euros (EUR 715 billion to EUR 1.87 trillion a year) and the Europol/Guardia Civil "Usura" operation (2016, ~EUR 62 million through real estate)
- taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu — EUR 10,000 cash declaration threshold at the EU border, rules for unaccompanied cash and the retention period for declaration data
- eur-lex.europa.eu — AMLR: EUR 10,000 due-diligence threshold for a one-off transaction and EUR 1,000 for a transfer of funds/crypto-assets (Art. 19); definition of a beneficial owner through a stake of 25% or more (Art. 52); 5-year document retention period (Art. 77); EUR 10,000 cash-payment limit from 10 July 2027 (Art. 80)
- eur-lex.europa.eu — Administrative fines under Directive (EU) 2015/849: at least EUR 1,000,000 or twice the benefit derived (Art. 59(2)(e)); at least EUR 5,000,000 or 10% of turnover for organisations (Art. 59(3)(a)); at least EUR 5,000,000 for individuals (Art. 59(3)(b))
- www.prosecutionservice.nl — ABN AMRO's EUR 480 million settlement (EUR 300 million fine + EUR 180 million disgorgement), systemic risk-classification failures affecting 5.5 million clients and the case of 192 accounts held for 49 companies
- www.amla.europa.eu — AMLA established on 26 June 2024, began operating in summer 2025, headquartered in Frankfurt, target staffing of around 430 by the end of 2027, direct supervision of selected entities from 2028
- fau.gov.cz — Performance figures of the Czech financial intelligence unit FAÚ: more than 28,000 closed cases and over CZK 21 billion frozen since it became independent
- www.fatf-gafi.org — Trade-based money laundering (TBML) typology: over/under-invoicing, multiple invoicing, shipment-volume mismatches
- www.fatf-gafi.org — FATF's risk-based guidance for the real estate sector (2022 update) and the recognition of high-end property as a persistent risk factor
- www.fatf-gafi.org — 18 jurisdictions under increased FATF monitoring as of 30 October 2026
- eur-lex.europa.eu — Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 establishes mandatory transmission of payer and payee data for transfers of crypto-assets between service providers (Travel Rule)